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Abstract: This article serves to identify the flaws in the three-pronged solution to the orphan 
works problem implemented in the UK. It concurrently questions the compatibility of the UK’s 
approach with the objectives sought to be achieved by the legislation; namely to ensure legal 
certainty with respect to the use of orphan works, to facilitate cross-border access to orphan 
works, to facilitate mass digitisation projects and to ensure that authors’ moral rights remain 
respected and protected. In addressing these issues, the article seeks to highlight aspects of the 
UK solution which could be amended in order to ensure that copyright law remains relevant 
and workable in the digital age, whilst maintaining a fair balance between protecting the 
interests of right holders and the public. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Orphan works, defined as ‘works … protected by copyright … for which no right holder has 
been identified, or, if identified, has not been located’, represent a significant barrier to the 
establishment of comprehensive digital libraries and databases.1 Mass digitisation projects 
such as the Google Books Library and Europeana (a pan-European digital archive intended to 
facilitate the sharing of European cultural heritage) have been drastically hindered by the fact 
that copyright clearance could not be obtained for works whose authors could not be located. 
Even where such clearance could, theoretically, be secured through lengthy and costly search 
procedures, the transaction cost of such procedures often far exceeds the cost of digitising the 
material, resulting in market inefficiency.2 
Organisational reluctance to initiate potentially fruitless and costly searches or, 
alternatively, to use works without authorisation and assume the risk of liability for copyright 
infringement, has resulted in ‘many works l[ying] unused that could create great value’. 3 
Indeed, the value that these works could create is not limited to financial value. They offer 
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1 Eleonora Rosati, ‘The Orphan Works Directive, or Throwing a Stone and Hiding the Hand’ (2013) 8(4) JIPLP 
303, 303. 
2  Anna Vuopala, ‘Assessment of the Orphan Works Issue and Costs for Rights Clearance’ (May 2010) 
<http://www.ace-film.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Copyright_anna_report-1.pdf> accessed 25 August 2015, 
6. 
3 Andrew Gowers, ‘Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (December 2006) 
 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228849/0118404830.pdf> 
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invaluable insights into national culture, considered by the European Commission to be of 
paramount importance in achieving the European Union's ‘strategic objectives of prosperity, 
solidarity and security’.4 Public access to a broad range of sources can also enable the exercise 
of freedom of speech by enhancing participation in the political discourse necessary to uphold 
democratic societies.5 
In light of the difficulties created by orphan works, the European Commission and UK 
legislature are to be commended for recognising, through the implementation of the Orphan 
Works Directive 2012 (hereinafter OWD) and the orphan works provisions in the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (hereinafter ERRA), that a legislative solution is required to 
prevent the disappearance of orphan works into a ‘20th century digital black hole’. 6 
Commendable, too, are the underlying objectives of these legislative instruments; to ensure 
legal certainty with respect to the use of orphan works,7 to facilitate cross-border access to 
orphan works, to facilitate mass digitisation projects such as the Google Books Library 
Project, 8  and to ensure that authors’ moral rights remain respected and protected in the 
process.9 
The purpose of this paper is not to propose a novel solution to the orphan works issue. 
Rather, it is to assess the adequacy of the solution which has been implemented in the UK. It 
seeks to determine whether the solution meets the aforementioned objectives and complies with 
relevant national and international legal requirements. 
                                                 
4 Nadine Klass and Hajo Rupp, ‘Europeana, Arrow and Orphan Works: Bringing Europe’s Cultural Heritage 
Online’ in Irini Stamadouti and Paul Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar 2014) 
948. 
5 Peter Menell, ‘Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age’ (2007) 44 Houston L Rev 
1013, 1042. 
6 Council Directive 2012/28/EC on certain permitted uses of orphan works [2012] OJ L 299/5; James Boyle, ‘A 
Copyright Black Hole Swallows our Culture’ Financial Times (London, 6 September 2009) 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6811a9d4-9b0f-11de-a3a1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3jmmKFT00> accessed 25 
August 2015. 
7 OWD, Recital 9. 
8 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment on the Cross-Border Online Access to Orphan Works’ COM 
(2011) 289 final <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/orphan-works/impact-assessment_en.pdf> 
accessed 27 August 2015, 14; OWD, Recital 5; European Commission, ‘Memorandum of Understanding on 
Key Principles on the Digitisation and Making Available of Out-of-Commerce Works’ (Brussels, 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/20110920-mou_en.pdf> accessed 25 
August 2015; Eleonora Rosati, ‘Copyright Issues Facing Early Stages of Digitization Projects’ (Mobile 
Collections Project, December 2013) 
<http://www.digitalhumanities.cam.ac.uk/Copyrightissuesfacingearlystagesofdigitizationprojects.pdf> accessed 
27 August 2015, 11. 
9  Intellectual Property Office, ‘Orphan Works in the UK and Overseas’ (July 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/312810/ipresearch-orphan-
overseas-201307.pdf> accessed 25 August 2015, 12. 
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Section B will explain why reverting to a system of copyright registration would be 
undesirable and will highlight the need for a novel solution to the orphan works problem. 
Section C will outline the current level of legislative intervention with regard to orphan works 
in the UK. Section D will question the degree of legal certainty it affords to potential users of 
orphan works. Section E will consider the ability of this legislation to facilitate cross-border 
access and mass digitisation efforts. Section F will assess its compliance with existing legal 
requirements. Section G will consider the respect and protection it affords to moral rights. The 
paper will conclude with a summary of its findings. 
 
B. THE NEED FOR A NOVEL SOLUTION 
Many attribute the emergence of the orphan works problem to the Berne Convention’s 
prohibition on mandatory formalities as a condition for the ‘enjoyment … and exercise’ of 
copyright.10 They call for the re-imposition of such formalities in the form of a mandatory 
registration requirement. 11  This course of action, however, is unlikely to eliminate the 
problem. 12  Whilst a registration requirement may ensure that only works intended to be 
exploited by their authors are protected by copyright, and would provide contact details for 
future potential users to seek licensing permissions, re-imposing such a formality would be 
impractical in ‘the digital age’.13 The emergence of digital communication technologies has 
minimised publication and distribution costs, enabling many more individuals to become 
authors of copyrightable works.14 As Greenberg observes, requiring a blogger to register for 
copyright protection in respect of each of the multiple blog posts he might make on a daily 
basis would be prohibitively expensive.15 In many cases, that blogger will be unable to predict 
with accuracy which of his works are likely to be commercially successful and worth 
expending the effort required to gain copyright protection.16 A register would also need to be 
updated following any transfers of intellectual property rights, if it were to be of real assistance 
to prospective users of orphan works.17 
                                                 
10 Stef van Gompel, ‘Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works 
in Europe?’ (2007) 38(6) IIC 669, 673; The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Berne Convention, as amended) Art 5(2). 
11 Christopher Sprigman, ‘Reform(aliz)ing Copyright’ (2004) 57 Stanford L Rev 485, 502. 
12 Berne Convention, Art 5(2). 
13 Brad Greenberg, ‘More Than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital 
Age’ (2012) 59 UCLALR 1028, 1033. 
14 ibid 1035-1036. 
15 ibid 1048. 
16 ibid 1049. 
17 Bernard Lang, ‘Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement – an International Perspective’ (2010-
11) 55 NY Sch L Rev 111, 149. 
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Such a registration requirement could actually discourage the creation of expressive 
works. Complying with a registration requirement would impose considerable costs upon serial 
creators, on top of the time and money initially expended in creating their works. It is likely to 
be more economically viable and require less time, money and effort for individuals to exploit 
existing unprotected works than to create and seek protection for their own. 18  Thus, the 
problem of inaccessible works would merely be replaced with one of a dearth of creative works 
altogether. A novel solution, rather than a reversion in copyright policy, is required to resolve 
the orphan works problem. 
 
C. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE ORPHAN WORKS 
PROBLEM 
The orphan works problem in the UK has been tackled using a three-pronged approach. The 
first prong consists of a narrowly circumscribed orphan works exception to the exclusive rights 
of reproduction and making available. This was introduced at EU level by the OWD, and has 
been implemented in the UK by the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted 
Uses of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014 (hereinafter CPUO Regulations).19 The regulations 
permit certain ‘relevant bod[ies]’ to reproduce orphan works for particular purposes and make 
them available, insofar as the use is in pursuit of a public interest mission.20 The orphan status 
of a work must be established by way of a diligent search before it may be used under this 
exception.21 The regulations set out mandatory sources to be consulted in the course of each 
diligent search, and list further relevant sources to be consulted for different categories of 
work.22 ‘Fair compensation’ will be payable to reappearing rightholders for the use of their 
work(s) under the exception.23 The regulations also explicitly recognise the principle of mutual 
recognition set out in the OWD.24 Under this principle, works in respect of which a qualifying 
diligent search has been conducted will be automatically recognised as orphans in every EU 
Member State. This obviates the need for duplication of diligent searches.25 
                                                 
18 Greenberg (n 13) 1050. 
19 SI 2014/2861. 
20 ibid, ss 1-2; ibid, s 6(b).  
21 ibid, s 5. 
22 ibid, s 5(3)(a)-(b); ibid, pt 2. 
23 ibid, s 7(3). 
24 ibid, s 4.  
25 Rosati (n 1) 308. 
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The second prong consists of a system of individual licensing for the use of orphan 
works. It is delineated in section 77 of the ERRA.26 Section 77 delegates to the Secretary of 
State much of the responsibility for determining how this system will operate in practice. The 
provisions she has made are contained in the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing 
of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014 (hereinafter LOW Regulations). 27  Like the CPUO 
Regulations, they require that a diligent search be carried out to confirm the orphan status of 
works for which licences are requested.28 The licences may authorise any act restricted by 
copyright, but may not grant exclusive rights in the work or be granted to a person authorised 
to grant licences.29 A ‘reasonable licence fee’ must be paid by the user of the orphan work.30 
This fee will be repaid to a rightholder who reappears within eight years of the date on which 
the orphan licence was granted in respect of his work.31 
The third prong consists of a system of extended collective licensing. It is also 
delineated in section 77 of the ERRA.32 Again, the Secretary of State is delegated a great deal 
of responsibility for determining the mechanics of the system. The provisions she has made are 
contained in the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) 
Regulations 2014 (hereinafter ECL Regulations).33 Under these regulations, licensing bodies 
fulfilling certain requirements may be authorised to grant copyright licences in respect of works 
in which the copyright is not owned by the body or any of its members.34 Non-members are 
afforded an option to opt-out.35 A licence fee will also be payable by prospective users of 
orphan works.36 This fee, minus a ‘reasonable administration’ fee, will be distributed to the 
relevant identifiable and locatable rightholders within nine months.37 The extended collective 
licensing scheme was intended to operate in parallel to the orphan works scheme, rather than 
                                                 
26 Section 77 of the ERRA inserts a new section 116A into the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 which 
deals with the individual licensing of orphan works. 
27 LOW Regulations, SI 2014/2863. 
28 ibid, s 4(1). 
29 ibid, s 6(2)(b); ibid, s 6(2)(a); ibid, s 6(4). 
30 ibid, s 10(1)(a). 
31 ibid, s 13(1). 
32 Section 77 of the ERRA also inserts a new section 116B into the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
which deals with extended collective licensing.  
33 SI 2014/2588. 
34 ibid, s 2(a)-(b). 
35 ibid, s 16(1). 
36 ibid, s 18(1). 
37 ibid. 
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as a means of tackling the problem.38 However, Mendis notes that the licensing of orphan 
works may also be covered by such extended collective licences.39 
 
D. THE PROMISE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY 
1. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works) Regulations 2014 
In implementing the OWD, the CPUO Regulations do not provide prospective users of orphan 
works with sufficiently clear information to be certain that their actions will fall within the 
scope of the orphan works exception. There are three main causes for this lack of clarity within 
the regulations. 
First, a number of terms used within the regulations are either poorly defined or 
completely undefined. Though section 2(1) lists ‘relevant bod[ies]’ that are entitled to use 
orphan works under the exception, no explicit definition is provided as to the meaning of a 
‘publicly accessible’ institution. Nor is a clear definition provided for the meaning of a ‘public 
interest mission’; the phrase is merely accompanied by a non-exhaustive list of examples.40 It 
is also unclear whether the public or private nature of an institution is a relevant factor to be 
considered.41 
Questions also arise regarding the definition of ‘relevant works’. 42  The CPUO 
Regulations suggest that only certain types of work held in the collections of certain beneficiary 
institutions will constitute relevant works. Section 2(2)(a) indicates that ‘a work in the form of 
a book, journal, newspaper, magazine or other writing’ will only be deemed ‘relevant’ where 
it is contained in the collection of a ‘publicly accessible library, educational establishment, 
museum, archive or film or audio heritage institution’. It is not clear whether the reference to 
‘other writings’ is intended to refer only to classic forms of literary work akin to those 
enumerated, or also to more modern forms such as computer programmes and source codes.43 
Section 2(2)(c) indicates that ‘cinematographic works, audiovisual works and sound 
recordings’ are the only forms of work contained in the archive of a public service broadcasting 
                                                 
38  Dinusha Mendis, ‘Orphan Works’ (COPYRIGHTUSER.ORG) <http://copyrightuser.org/topics/orphan-
works/> accessed 26 August 2015. 
39 ibid. 
40 CPUO Regulations, s 6(b). 
41 Marie‐Christine Janssens and Rán Tryggvadóttir, ‘Facilitating Access to Orphan and Out of Commerce Works 
to Make Europe's Cultural Resources Available to the Broader Public’ (2014) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538097> accessed 26 August 2015, 9. 
42 CPUO Regulations, s 2. 
43 Uma Suthersanen and Maria Mercedes Frabboni, ‘The Orphan Works Directive’ in Irini Stamadouti and Paul 
Torremans (eds) EU Copyright Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar 2014) 653, 659. 
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organisation which may be deemed ‘relevant works’. It is unclear why a ‘book, journal, 
newspaper, magazine or other writing’ contained in the archive of a public service broadcasting 
organisation may not also achieve ‘relevant work’ status. It is also unclear whether institutions 
are confined only to one, or may fall under multiple ‘relevant body’ classifications.44 Arguably, 
a library may also be considered an educational establishment, a museum also an archive, and 
a broadcasting organisation also a film or audio heritage institution. No definition is provided 
for any of these terms. 
The regulations also state that a rightholder may put an end to the orphan status of a 
work by providing evidence of his ownership.45 However, no clear indication is provided as to 
what standard of ‘evidence’ is required, or what form it should take. The method by which the 
‘fair compensation’ to which a reappearing rightholder is entitled is to be calculated is also 
unclear. Furthermore, no definition is provided of the ‘reasonable period’ within which a 
rightholder is entitled to claim such compensation.46 
Secondly, it is extremely difficult for prospective users of orphan works to know 
whether certain obligations imposed upon them by the regulations have been fulfilled. Though 
the regulations require that a diligent search be conducted to determine the orphan status of a 
work, and set out relevant sources to be consulted for each category of relevant work, they fail 
to specify whether consulting each of the specified sources will automatically guarantee 
operation of the exception. The regulations also require that consultation of these sources be 
conducted either in the Member State in which the work was first published or broadcast, or 
the Member State in which the organisation that first made the work available with the consent 
of the rightholders is established.47 
Given that the information potential users have about orphan works and their owners is 
necessarily limited, it will not be easy to determine whether a work is protected by copyright 
and has been published or broadcast, let alone to determine in which Member State this may 
have occurred. Indeed, no independent body is appointed to verify the diligence of a search.48 
                                                 
44 Robin Kerremans, ‘A Critical View on the European Draft Directive for Orphan Works’ (2012) 1 QMJIP 38, 
53. 
45 CPUO Regulations, s 7(2). 
46 ibid, s 7(3). 
47 ibid, s 5(5); ibid, s 5(7). 
48 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Government Response to the Technical Consultation on Orphan Works’ (July 
2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315078/Orphan_Works_Govern
ment_Response.pdf> accessed 26 August 2015, 5. 
It’s a Hard Knock Life: A Critique of the Legislative Response to the Orphan Works Problem 
in the UK 
8 
Prospective users of orphan works are, therefore, required to ‘self-assess’ the adequacy of their 
diligent search efforts.49 
Section 2(4) of the regulations states that use may only be made of orphan works under 
the exception ‘as long as it is reasonable to assume that the rightholders would not oppose the 
use of the work’. It is likely to be almost impossible for a prospective user of orphan works to 
prove the reasonableness of his assumption that a rightholder, about whom he has no 
information, would not oppose the use he intends to make of the work.50 
Thirdly, the regulations fail to provide guidance as to the correct course of action where 
foreseeable difficulties arise. One such foreseeable difficulty is a lack of response from 
institutions contacted in the course of a diligent search. The CPUO Regulations do not impose 
any statutory obligation on the institutions listed to respond to diligent search requests.51 Nor 
do they clarify how long the applicant is reasonably expected to wait for a response. Another 
foreseeable difficulty is the charging of excessive fees by institutions in return for provision of 
requested information about a particular work.52 Both difficulties constitute reasons for non-
compliance with diligent search requirements that are outside the applicant’s control. It would 
surely be unjust if these reasons for non-compliance served to invalidate an otherwise diligent 
search. Unfortunately, whether or not such reasons for non-compliance would invalidate a 
search is not addressed within the regulations. 
The degree of ambiguity evident in the CPUO Regulations is particularly concerning, 
given that beneficiary institutions in pursuit of a ‘public interest mission’ are likely to have 
limited funds with which to secure sophisticated legal advice. 
2. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) 
Regulations 2014 
Regrettably, the system of individual licensing detailed in the LOW Regulations reflects a 
number of the same uncertainties which plague the CPUO Regulations. The LOW Regulations 
also fail to implement a statutory obligation on listed institutions to respond to diligent search 
requests, and to clarify how a reappearing rightholder is to ‘satisfy the authorising body…of 
                                                 
49 Ellen Franziska Schulze, ‘Orphan Works and other Orphan Material under National, Regional and International 
Law: Analysis, Proposals and Solutions’ (2012) 34(5) EIPR 313, 317. 
50 Janssens and Tryggvadóttir (n 41) 12. 
51 Theo Savvides and Briony Pollard, ‘Who’s Your Daddy? Orphan Works and the New UK Licensing Scheme 
and Exception for Permitted Use’ Intellectual Property Magazine (London, December 2014) 
<http://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/branding/whos-your-daddy-105011.htm> accessed 27 August 
2015. 
52 ibid. 
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their ownership … of relevant rights in the orphan work’.53 Though they offer somewhat more 
guidance as to calculation of the payable licensing fee than the CPUO Regulations regarding 
‘fair compensation’, this additional guidance is inadequate. It is not sufficiently clear to enable 
prospective users to predict the level of licensing fees that will be payable for particular uses 
of orphan works. Section 10(1)(a) indicates that, in calculating payable licence fees, regard 
should be had to the fees achieved under licences for similar uses of similar non-orphan works. 
However, it is not clear in what sense the works should be similar. If the orphan work happened 
to be Anne Frank’s Diary, would ‘similar’ non-orphan works be other diaries written by 
adolescents during the Holocaust, or, more generally, any other literary works? 
Three more areas of ambiguity within the LOW Regulations are particularly apparent. 
First, though section 6(4) specifies that a licence to use orphan works may not be granted to ‘a 
person authorised to grant licences’, it is unclear whether this extends just to the Comptroller-
General, or also to others working in the Intellectual Property Office. If ‘person’ were intended 
to cover legal as well as human persons, it is also conceivable that the restriction on granting 
orphan works licences could extend to the Intellectual Property Office itself, given that ‘a legal 
person is any individual, firm or government agency with the right to enter into binding 
agreements.’54 
Secondly, uncertainty stems from the conflicting conceptions of a ‘relevant work’ in 
sections 3(1) and 3(6). While section 3(1) defines a relevant work as ‘a work protected by 
copyright or a performance in respect of which certain acts constitute restricted acts’, section 
3(6) refers to relevant work[s] ‘in which it is not known whether copyright or the right to permit 
or prohibit the restricted act subsists’.55 The inconsistency between the two regulations leaves 
prospective users unclear as to whether copyright protection is a necessary prerequisite to 
obtaining an orphan licence. If it is, similar difficulties in confirming the existence of such 
copyright protection arise as under the CPUO Regulations.  
Thirdly, the broad discretion afforded to the authorising body under section 6(5)(b) to 
refuse to grant licences ‘on any…reasonable ground’ is likely to cause uncertainty amongst 
prospective users as to whether they are likely to be granted an orphan works licence. Given 
                                                 
53 LOW Regulations, s 12(1). 
54  Lewis Kornhauser and Bentley MacLeod, ‘Contracts Between Legal Persons’ (2010) National Bureau of 
Economic Research 1, 2. 
55 Tom Rivers, ‘A Fuss About Something?’ (2015) 37(1) EIPR 4, 7. 
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the prevalence of the organisational ‘risk managed’ mentality, such uncertainty may discourage 
prospective users of orphan works from assuming the cost of diligent searches.56  
3. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) 
Regulations 2014 
Perhaps the greatest legal uncertainty facing prospective orphan work users is whether or not 
the ECL Regulations permit the grant of extended collective licences for the use of orphan 
works. Despite statements from the Intellectual Property Office suggesting that extended 
collective licensing is ‘not intended to be the default solution for licensing works that are, or 
could be orphans’, the ECL Regulations do not explicitly exempt orphan works from their 
remit.57 In order to obtain authorisation to grant extended collective licenses, relevant licensing 
bodies must demonstrate that they represent ‘a significant number of rightholders relevant to 
the works and uses covered by the proposed scheme’.58 However, no guidance is provided as 
to what is meant by ‘significant’. If ‘a significant number’ is intended to refer to a majority of 
relevant rightholders, this majority representation could easily be obtained without involving 
orphan work rightholders. This supposes, not inconceivably, that rightholders in orphan works 
constitute the minority in any given category of work or use. Being non-locatable and in the 
minority, orphan work rightholders would fall into the class of ‘non-member rightholder[s]’ 
who have not opted out, on behalf of whom relevant licensing bodies are authorised to grant 
extended collective licences. Even if ‘a significant number’ simply intended to mean a number 
of rightholders that is not insignificant, relevant licensing bodies will still be able to show that 
they are sufficiently representative without involving orphan rightholders. This task would, in 
fact, be easier than if ‘significant’ was intended to refer to a majority.  
In light of this analysis, it is unfortunate that the Intellectual Property Office has 
expressed the aforementioned doubts regarding the applicability of the extended collective 
licensing scheme to orphan works. These are likely to confuse prospective users of orphan 
works as to the licensing options available to them. 
                                                 
56 Naomi Korn, ‘In from the Cold: An Assessment of the Scope of ‘Orphan Works’ and its Impact on the Delivery 
of Services to the Public’ (April 2009) 
<http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20140615221324/http:/www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/publ
ications/infromthecoldv1.pdf> accessed 26 August 2015, 6. 
57  Intellectual Property Office, ‘FACTSHEET – Orphan Works Licensing Scheme and Extended Collective 
Licensing’ (June 2014) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/orphanworks-
licensing.pdf> accessed 26 August 2015. 
58 ECL Regulations, s 4(4)(b). 
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Expressing such doubts is even more regrettable when one takes into consideration the 
fact that seeking an extended collective licence is a much more attractive option for prospective 
users of orphan works than that provided by either the CPUO or LOW Regulations. Though 
relevant licensing bodies are obliged under section 18(3) of the ECL Regulations to ‘distribute 
the appropriate portion of the net licence fee to those non-member rightholders who have been 
identified and located’, no guidance is provided as to the standard of search required to identify 
and locate such rightholders. Therefore, it is estimated that the expected standard of search 
would fall below the ‘diligent search’ standard required by the LOW Regulations. Whatever 
the required standard of search, responsibility for meeting it is transferred from the prospective 
user to the relevant licensing body. Thus, by obtaining an extended collective licence to use 
orphan works, users could avoid expending time, effort and money in conducting potentially 
fruitless diligent searches. 
 
E. FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER ACCESS AND MASS DIGITISATION 
1. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works) Regulations 2014 
Had the OWD lived up to its title as an instrument fit to ‘remove market fragmentation and 
provide a legal framework that favours EU competitiveness’, the transposing CPUO 
Regulations could have played a small part in harmonising the approach of all EU Member 
States with respect to orphan works.59 If this approach had been harmonised, cross-border 
operations involving the use of orphan works in the EU could have been made simpler and 
cheaper. Corporations operating across a number of EU countries could have significantly 
reduced the regulatory cost involved in complying with differing national licensing and diligent 
search requirements. Those involved in mass digitisation initiatives could have similarly 
benefitted. Regrettably, the OWD has failed to realise these potential benefits. In providing for 
an extremely limited exception available only to a restricted list of institutions, and in stating 
that it operates without prejudice to national systems of rights management, the OWD invites 
the establishment of additional, potentially conflicting, national regimes. In effect, it actively 
discourages any potentially harmonising effect. As Rosati submits, where Member States 
                                                 
59 Janssens and Tryggvadóttir (n 41) 4. 
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remain free to select their own regulatory approach to orphan works, there is ‘no room for the 
creation of an EU level playing field’.60 
This broad discretion afforded to Member States fails to address the existing difficulties 
faced by those involved in mass online digitisation projects. Given the territorial nature of 
intellectual property rights, the legality of making works available on the internet tends to be 
judged according to the laws of each country in which they are made available.61 Therefore, 
the greater the variations in approach to orphan rights management across different 
jurisdictions, the more costly and difficult it is to ensure that one’s use of an orphan work online 
complies with every system.  
The degree of uncertainty which surrounds the issue of the applicable law in cases of 
online copyright infringement serves only to make compliance more difficult. Though Article 
5(2) of the Berne Convention states that ‘the extent of [copyright] protection, as well as the 
means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by 
the laws of the country where protection is claimed’, Wilson notes that the ‘country where 
protection is claimed’ has been afforded many differing interpretations.62 In internet cases, it 
has been taken to refer to the place where the effect of the infringement is felt, the place where 
the work has been accessed, and, more recently, the place in which the servers enabling access 
to the material are located.63 This uncertainty further highlights the need for a fully harmonised 
EU-wide (if not global) orphan works solution. 
The OWD and transposing CPUO Regulations attempt to cloak the feebleness of this 
attempt at harmonisation behind the façade of mutual recognition of orphan work status. This 
principle is unlikely to have much of a mitigating effect in practice, however. Under EU law, 
Directives are mandatory only with regard to the result to be achieved, meaning that Member 
States are afforded a margin of appreciation in determining the form that the implementing 
measures will take.64 Therefore, the exception is likely to be implemented by Member States 
in varying forms. Some, like the UK, will choose to implement various forms of orphan work 
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licensing system in addition to the exception. Indeed, mutual recognition does not account for 
the fact that differences in national copyright law may mean that a work which is orphaned in 
one jurisdiction is not orphaned in another.65 For example, Dutch copyright law dictates that 
an employer owns all rights in works created by his employees in the course of their 
employment. 66  Under German copyright law, however, the rights vest in the employee-
creator.67 An inability to locate the employer following a diligent search would result in the 
work being deemed an orphan work under Dutch law, but would have no bearing on the status 
of the work under German law.  
The fact that the orphan works exception applies only to certain institutions pursuing 
public interest missions operates as a further barrier to mass digitisation efforts. With 
commercial operations excluded from its scope, the exception is wholly unsuited to facilitating 
the use of orphan works in commercial mass digitisation initiatives such as the Google Books 
Library. Even non-commercial initiatives are likely to be significantly hindered by the fact that 
stand-alone photographs and images are excluded from the scope of the exception. 
Undoubtedly, images could add a great deal to a ‘repository of cultural heritage’ such as 
Europeana. 68  Their exclusion appears particularly anomalous in light of the fact that 
photographs tend to bear less identifying information than other kinds of work, and therefore 
are significantly more susceptible to orphanage.69 
In addition, fulfilling the requirement that a diligent search be conducted in respect of 
each orphan work intended to be used under the exception ‘may be prohibitively costly’ in the 
context of mass digitisation.70 The fact that section 5(8) requires consultation of sources of 
information ‘in other countries’, where there is evidence to suggest that relevant information 
on rightholders is to be found there, and is not limited to other European countries, increases 
the likelihood that carrying out multiple diligent searches will be prohibitively costly.71 
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2. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) 
Regulations 2014 
While the licensing scheme provided for by the LOW Regulations is available to both 
commercial and non-commercial users, the fact that it also requires a diligent search for each 
orphan work renders it similarly unsuited to facilitating the use of orphan works in mass 
digitisation initiatives. 
In addition, the regulations facilitate cross-border access to orphan works only to a 
limited extent. Despite allowing for the grant of licences for the use of orphan works hailing 
from foreign jurisdictions, these licences are valid only in the UK.72 Thus, while cross-border 
access to orphan works is enhanced for initial users seeking to make use of the work, such 
access is not concurrently enhanced for consumers of mass digitised materials. Because the 
terms of such orphan works licences only permit use of the work within the UK, disseminating 
the work online would likely constitute a breach of the terms of the licence, even when existing 
ambiguities as to the correct ‘place of infringement’ are accounted for.  
Though technological protection measures such as geo-blockers may be used to restrict 
access to orphan materials to solely UK-based users, the premise behind mass digitisation 
projects is that they facilitate the sharing of information on a large scale. It is highly improbable 
that the goal shared by both Europeana and the Google Books Library to ‘democratize access 
to the world’s collective knowledge’ could be achieved through disseminating materials online 
in only one country.73 Furthermore, as Savvides and Pollard note, technological protection 
measures are costly and time-consuming to operate, and require regular updating to keep pace 
with technological advances.74 They also operate ‘blind’, in the sense that they are unable to 
discern whether a user is about to make a lawful or unlawful use of a work.75 
Having to pay a licence fee prior to the use of individual orphan works also hinders the 
number of orphan works that may be used in mass digitisation projects. Licence fee payments 
eat away at the finite financial resources backing mass digitisation initiatives. Evidently, the 
more licence fees that must be paid, the fewer orphan works that may be used. There appears 
to be no good reason why this fee could not be paid upon reappearance of orphan works 
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rightholders, rather than upfront. Given that rightholders are unlikely to reappear in the 
majority of cases, prospective users could retain fees which would otherwise be used to fund 
arbitrary ‘social, cultural and educational activities’ and make greater use of orphan works.76 
3. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) 
Regulations 2014 
In one sense, the licensing system envisaged by the ECL Regulations appears much better 
suited to facilitating the use of orphan works in mass digitisation projects than the previous two 
options. Unlike the CPUO and LOW Regulations, the ECL Regulations impose no obligation 
upon prospective users of presumed orphan works to conduct diligent searches. Thus, users 
seeking to digitise orphan work materials on a mass scale would not face the high transaction 
costs involved in individual rights clearance under the orphan work exception and individual 
licensing models. 
However, like the individual orphan works licensing system under the LOW 
Regulations, extended collective licensing schemes require upfront payment of licence fees. 
They are also limited in their ability to facilitate cross-border access to orphan works. While 
both models appear to allow licensing in respect of works of foreign origin, both forms of 
licence are valid only within the territory in which they are granted.  
Indeed, the legitimacy of allowing relevant licensing organisations to grant extended 
collective licences in respect of foreign works is questionable, at the very least. Though the 
Intellectual Property Office has stated that, under the ECL Regulations, ‘foreign rights-holders 
will be in the same position as UK rights holders’, this claim does not correspond with the 
stated representation requirements.77 As previously discussed, section 4(4)(b) requires relevant 
licensing bodies to have significant representation in the type of relevant works which are to 
be the subject of the proposed extended collective licensing scheme. Section 2 defines 
‘representation’ as the extent to which the relevant licensing body currently acts on behalf of 
rightholders and holds rightholders’ rights in respect of the works relevant to the proposed 
licensing scheme. If foreign rightholders’ works are intended to be included in an extended 
collective licensing scheme, it is unlikely that a UK-based relevant licensing authority could 
act on behalf of, and hold the rights of a ‘significant number’ of works within the global, or 
even EU-wide sphere. This applies whether ‘a significant number’ is intended to mean a 
majority or merely a not-insignificant number. Again, the regulations provide no interpretative 
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guidance in this regard, though De la Durantaye supports the view of this author that no one 
relevant licensing authority could represent a significant number of rightholders from all 
European Member States.78 
Regardless of the legitimacy of granting licences in respect of foreign works, users 
seeking to disseminate orphan materials online under extended collective licences without 
extra-territorial effect face the same risk of breaching licence terms as licensees under the LOW 
Regulations. 
 
F. COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
As a signatory of the Berne Convention, the UK legislature is bound by the prohibition in 
Article 5(2) of the imposition of mandatory formalities as a condition for the normal exercise 
or enjoyment of rights (including copyright). Article 9(2) authorises contracting states to 
provide for exceptions and limitations to the right of reproduction, only to the extent that they 
comply with what has become known as ‘the three-step test’. According to this test, exceptions 
or limitations must constitute ‘special cases’ and they must not ‘conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work’ or ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author’. This 
test is re-stated in Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive and Article 13 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, to which the UK is also 
party.79 
Exceptions to copyright owners’ exclusive rights are partially harmonised throughout 
Europe. 80  Though the Information Society Directive enumerates an exhaustive list of 
exceptions and limitations, Member States are afforded a great deal of discretion as to how and 
which of these exceptions are implemented at national level.81 Only one exception, covering 
transient or incidental copying as part of a network transmission or legal use, is mandatory, and 
many of the remaining exceptions are so broadly worded that they have been deemed 
‘prototypes for national law-making, rather than precisely circumscribed exceptions’.82 
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1. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works) Regulations 2014 
Recital 32 of the Information Society Directive states that it ‘provides for an exhaustive 
enumeration of exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right and the right of 
communication to the public’. It is axiomatic, therefore, that introducing a new orphan works 
exception, which the OWD and CPUO Regulations purport to do, necessitates amendment of 
this Directive.83 However, provision for such an amendment does not appear to have been 
made. Indeed, the fact that Recital 20 of the OWD says ‘Member States should provide for an 
exception or limitation in addition to those provided for in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29/EC 
[emphasis added]’ could arguably be taken to mean that amendment of the existing list is not 
envisaged, and that the exception is intended to simply co-exist with this list. 
This argument is supported by the fact that no explicit mention is made in the OWD or 
the CPUO Regulations of the need to amend the Information Society Directive. Though Article 
9(1) of the OWD states that ‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive’, this is not addressed within 
the transposing CPUO Regulations. Even if provisions purporting to modify the Information 
Society Directive were implemented at national level, they would be insufficient to amend 
legislation made at EU level. Thus, it appears that the orphan works exception is not wholly 
compliant with EU law. 
In the event that the Information Society Directive is suitably amended, and the orphan 
works exception is added to its exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations, the exception, as 
implemented at by the CPUO Regulations, will still have to pass the three-step test to be in full 
compliance with EU law. 
According to the first step of the test, the exception must be confined to a ‘certain 
special case’.84 The WTO panel, in applying the test, has clarified that ‘certain’ is intended to 
mean ‘clearly defined’, and that ‘special’ is intended to mean ‘narrow in scope and reach’.85 
Despite Kerremans’ dismissal of this first prong as a mere ‘tautology’, as ‘an exception always 
entails a special case which differs from the general rule’, the fact that courts regularly apply 
                                                 
83 Ioannis Iglezakis, E-Publishing and Digital Libraries: Legal and Organizational Issues (IGI Global 2010) 211. 
84 Berne Convention, Art 9(2). 
85 Jane Ginsburg, ‘Contracts, Orphan Works, and Copyright Norms: What Role for Berne and TRIPs?’ (2009) 
Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers 1, 16. 
It’s a Hard Knock Life: A Critique of the Legislative Response to the Orphan Works Problem 
in the UK 
18 
the full test in order to determine the validity of national exceptions indicates that compliance 
cannot always be assumed.86  
Academic literature reveals conflicting views as to whether the orphan works exception 
would constitute a special case. While Schulze opines that a class of works whose authors 
cannot be located would be too wide to constitute a special case, Bronder takes the opposite 
stance.87 However, given that the group of users intended to avail of this particular exception 
is limited to certain institutions in pursuit of a public-interest, rather than just any individual 
who cannot locate the owner of the work, it is suggested that the exception is both clearly 
defined and narrow in scope and reach. 
According to the second step of the test, the exception must not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work.88 It has been argued that the use of works under the orphan works 
exception would not pose problems under this step of the test. Because the owners of the orphan 
works are not extracting economic value from them, it is argued that there is no ‘normal 
exploitation’.89 This approach is mirrored by the WTO panel’s focus on income-generating 
forms of exploitation.90 This interpretation of the second step of the test, it is argued, is unduly 
blinkered. It presumes that exploitation necessarily equates with financial reward, and fails to 
account for non-financial forms of exploitation. To ‘exploit’ is to ‘make full use of and derive 
benefit from a resource’.91 Conceivably, an orphan work owner could be considered to be 
‘making full use’ of his work by exercising his choice not to grant licences for its use. He could 
also be said to be deriving benefit, or at least avoiding potential harm, by choosing not to 
publicly disclose a work containing information which might tarnish his honour and reputation. 
In support of this argument, it has been noted that deeming a failure to extract economic value 
from one’s work to be a failure to ‘normal[ly] exploit the work’ could have the effect of 
depriving locatable authors of control over exploitations of their work, if they declined to 
authorise certain uses.92  
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This reasoning may be squared with the narrow interpretation of ‘conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work’ adopted by the Advocate General in the Infopaq decision.93 
In this case, it was held that the provision of newspaper extracts containing search terms that 
had been inputted into a search engine conflicted with the normal exploitation of the work 
under the three-step test. It was held that making these extracts available was likely to have 
some impact on full newspaper sales. This impact could not have been expected to be 
significant, as individuals are unlikely to view short, out-of-context newspaper extracts as 
acceptable substitutes for full newspapers. Therefore, the implication is that the prospect of 
even a meagre loss of sales may be sufficient for an exception to fail the second prong of the 
three-step test. If, applying the reasoning in the previous paragraph, it is possible to ‘normally 
exploit’ one’s works by choosing not to make them available to the public, in the interests of 
maintaining one’s reputation, then it follows that the prospect of even a small amount of 
damage to that reputation could also result in failure to satisfy the test. 
The third step of the test requires that the exception must not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author.94 In Wilson’s view, it is unlikely that any orphan works 
exception would satisfy this requirement.95 She believes that this is because orphan work 
rightholders are not given an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the exploitation of 
their works, often because they are unaware of any exploitation.96 Thus, she considers that the 
interests of the author of an orphan work would be ‘unreasonably prejudiced’ once his work is 
used without his permission. 97  However, this argument fails to account for the fact that 
rightholders are unlikely to be aware that their works are being exploited when they are used 
under any exception, whether they are locatable or not. Exceptions, by their nature, allow for 
deviations from the exclusive rights of exploitation afforded to rightholders under copyright 
law. Permission is not required to be sought from rightholders in order to make use of their 
copyrighted works under an exception, nor are rightholders required to be put on notice of such 
use.98 The fact that a rightholder is ‘locatable’ does not necessarily mean that he is more likely 
to discover that his work is being used under an exception. 
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It is submitted that use of an orphan work under an exception would tend only to 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author where the work has not previously 
been published or made available. Failure to make one’s work available to the public, whether 
for profit or not, is likely to be a strong indicator that the author had cause to withhold it. This 
may have been for a myriad reasons. For example, he may have feared damage to his 
reputation, or have intended to delay release of the work so that he would have time to publicise 
it, build media hype, and thus secure greater commercial reward. Alternatively, he may have 
decided that the work needed to be rewritten or reformulated before it was ready to be publicly 
released. 
For this reason, Bronder suggests that the most cautious approach for introducing an 
orphan works exception would be to exclude unpublished and undisclosed works from its 
remit. 99  The CPUO Regulations have adopted this cautious approach in stating that the 
exception applies only to works which have been published, broadcast or made publicly 
accessible. The CPUO Regulations also provide for remuneration in the form of ‘fair 
compensation’, which the WTO Panel believes may ‘convert an unreasonable prejudice into a 
reasonable one’.100 The orphan works exception seems, therefore, to satisfy this third step of 
the three-step test. 
2. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) 
Regulations 2014 
Given that the three-step test is only intended to apply to exceptions and limitations to 
rightholders’ exclusive rights, it would appear, prima facie, that licences should not fall within 
its remit. Arguably, however, this will not be the case where the effect of the licence is 
equivalent to that of an exception. Section 16(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 states that ‘copyright in a work is infringed by a person who, without a licence from the 
copyright owner, does or authorises another to do any acts restricted by copyright.’ This is 
tempered by section 50, which states that ‘where the doing of a particular act is specifically 
authorised by an Act of Parliament … then, unless the Act [referring to the CDPA] provides 
otherwise, the doing of that act does not infringe copyright’. Thus, it is clear that either a licence 
from the copyright owner, or specific authorisation under an Act of Parliament is required to 
absolve a user from liability under copyright law. 
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Section 6(2)(b) of the LOW Regulations provides for the grant of licences which permit 
acts in respect of orphan works that are ‘restricted by the copyright or sections 182, 182A, 
182B, 182C, 182CA, 183 or 184 of the Act [referring to the CDPA]’. Evidently, a licence from 
a licensing body is not the same as a licence from the copyright owner, as required by the 
CDPA. Furthermore, Rosati notes that it is the LOW Regulations, devised by the Secretary of 
State, which specifically provide for the grant of licences to use orphan works, rather than the 
relevant Act of Parliament (meaning the ERRA).101 
Thus, for the licensing system provided for by the LOW Regulations to have the 
intended effect, whilst also complying with the CDPA, it must operate in practice as an 
exception. As an exception, it will need to be added to the exhaustive list of limitations and 
exceptions in the Information Society Directive to be permissible under EU copyright law. It 
must also comply with the three-step test set out in the Berne Convention. 
It is submitted that the ‘exception’ provided by the LOW Regulations would be much 
less likely to satisfy the first step of the test than the orphan works exception enumerated by 
the CPUO Regulations. It is much less clearly defined and restricted in scope. Unlike the 
orphan works exception, which is limited to certain institutions pursuing a public interest 
mission, any applicant complying with the diligent search requirements under the LOW 
Regulations may be granted a territorial, non-exclusive licence. Additionally, while the uses 
permitted by the orphan works exception are limited to making the work available to the public 
and reproduction for the purposes of digitisation, making available, indexing, cataloguing, 
preservation or restoration, licences granted under the LOW Regulations permit any acts 
restricted by copyright. 
In light of the previous analysis of the meaning of the ‘normal exploitation of the work’, 
and the conclusion that it encompasses non-financial forms of exploitation, including purposely 
withholding one’s work from the public sphere, it appears that the licensing system under the 
LOW Regulations would also fail the second step of the test. If the rightholder in an orphan 
work prefers to ‘exploit’ said work by keeping it undisclosed, then a licence permitting ‘any 
acts restricted by the copyright’ must necessarily interfere with the rightholder’s desired form 
of exploitation. 
Turning to the third step of the test, the fact that orphan works subject to the licensing 
scheme under the LOW Regulations are not limited to those which are published or have been 
made available is likely to result in unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the 
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rightholder. In failing to exclude works that have not been published or made available, the 
LOW Regulations disregard the cautious approach recommended by Bronder and adopted by 
the OWD and CPUO Regulations.102 This may result in particularly undesirable consequences 
for rightholders. In light of the afore-discussed reasons why a rightholder might consciously 
delay or decline to disclose his work, such consequences could amount to reputational damage, 
or reduction in revenues in the event of future financial exploitation of the work. 
3. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) 
Regulations 2014 
Given that extended collective licences, like licences granted under the LOW Regulations, 
operate as de facto exceptions, it is submitted that they, too, are subject to the requirements of 
the three-step test. Despite the fact that the Satellite and Cable Directive has endorsed the 
applicability of the extended collective licensing model in certain circumstances, and that the 
Information Society Directive is without prejudice to agreements in Member States concerning 
the management of rights such as extended collective licensing, this should not be taken to 
guarantee that its application will always be fully compliant with international legal 
requirements.103 
Though there is no explicit restriction on the types of copyright-protected work and 
uses in respect of which extended collective licences may be granted, such licences will only 
be available in respect of works and uses represented by an authorised ‘relevant licensing 
body’. 104  Individual licensing bodies will only be authorised to issue extended collective 
licences for specific uses of specific kinds of work. As Riis and Schovsbo observe, an 
assessment of whether extended collective licensing schemes constitute ‘certain special cases’ 
should, therefore, consider individual schemes rather than the aggregate number permitted 
under a particular set of regulations.105 Conducting an assessment of licensing schemes in the 
aggregate could lead to anomalous results, particularly under the first step of the test. There 
would necessarily come a point where the authorisation of another scheme would cast the 
‘exception’ beyond the bounds of a certain special case. This would not allow for consideration 
of the nature of the uses and works covered by the scheme at the tipping point, which may have 
been extremely limited in scope. Given that the regulations have only recently been introduced, 
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the scope of the respective extended collective licensing schemes authorised thereunder 
remains to be seen. 
Just as under the LOW Regulations, however, the category of potential beneficiaries 
entitled to apply for extended collective licences is unlimited. In addition, because the ECL 
Regulations are not specifically intended to tackle the orphan works problem, they do not 
require applicants for licences to undertake any form of diligent search as a prerequisite to 
being granted a licence. It is unlikely, therefore, that extended collective licences granted under 
the regulations would be deemed sufficiently clearly defined and narrow in scope and reach to 
satisfy the first prong of the test, regardless of how limited the class of works and permitted 
uses. 
This said, a number of academics have argued that the extended collective licensing 
systems for copyright which are commonplace in Nordic countries would satisfy the second 
step of the test.106 Far from conflicting with the normal exploitation of copyright works, they 
suggest that, in these countries, having a large portion of copyrights and related rights 
administered by way of extended collective licence is itself a form of normal exploitation. Even 
if this were the case, however, it is far from clear that extended collective licensing could be 
considered a form of ‘normal exploitation’ of copyright works in the UK. Such systems have 
been in place in Nordic countries since the 1960s, whereas they have only recently been 
introduced in the UK.107 In the event that this form of licensing does become accepted and 
popular in the UK, it is unclear at exactly what point it shifts from being an abnormal form of 
exploitation to a normal form. Given that collective rights management is ‘still rather under-
developed … in the photographic and audiovisual fields’, however, it must be assumed that 
this shifting process will be slow.108 
Indeed, this raises an interesting question over the correct interpretation of the second 
step of the test where two forms of ‘normal exploitation’ conflict. Assuming that there are 
many ways in which a work may be exploited, and that both exploitation under an extended 
collective licence and non-financial exploitation through conscious non-disclosure of one’s 
work constitute forms of normal exploitation, it is clear that the two are not fully compatible. 
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Although a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is conceivable that 
each might render the other non-compliant with the second step of the test. 
Moving on to consider the third step of the test, the ECL Regulations – like the LOW 
Regulations – contain no broad provision excluding works which have not been published or 
made available from the scope of extended collective licensing schemes. However, it may be 
that the categories of use and work in respect of which individual relevant licensing bodies 
seek authorisation to operate extended collective licensing schemes are, in fact, limited in this 
way. Therefore, whether individual schemes unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the rightholder will vary from case to case.  
If unpublished and undisclosed works are not excluded, it is unlikely that remuneration 
provisions in the ECL Regulations will suffice to ‘convert an unreasonable prejudice into a 
reasonable one’.109 This is because extended collective licensing schemes tend to work in 
favour of local authors.110 Foreign rightholders ‘often do not get the remuneration they deserve 
for use of their works’.111 Though section 4(4)(e) obliges relevant licensing bodies to have 
arrangements in place for contacting non-member right holders and distributing net licence 
fees, no guidance is provided as to what such arrangements should entail. The regulations state 
only that the arrangements should be ‘appropriate for the proposed scheme, having regard to 
the interests of non-member rightholders’.112 The fact that administration fees deducted by the 
licensing body must be ‘reasonable’ suggests that high notification and distribution costs for 
rightholders in foreign jurisdictions may not be covered, and it is therefore less likely that they 
will receive the remuneration to which they are entitled.113 
Aside from the questionable compatibility of the ECL Regulations with the 
requirements under the three-step test, having to ‘opt-out’ to avoid having one’s work exploited 
under an extended collective licence could constitute a forbidden formality under Article 5(2) 
of the Berne Convention.114 While Ringnalda suggests that the Convention may only have 
intended to prohibit formalities forming a barrier to the initial grant of copyright, this 
interpretation does not correspond with the wording of the instrument.115 Article 5(2) clearly 
states that ‘the enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.’ 
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This indicates that the prohibition on formalities extends beyond the grant of rights, to the use 
and enjoyment of those rights that have been granted. Given that copyright protection vests 
automatically in original works which are recorded in material form, it certainly appears that 
having to fill out and issue an ‘opt-out notice’ in order to prevent one’s work from being 
licensed out against one’s will would affect the enjoyment and exercise of exclusive rights 
under copyright law.116  
Finally, it must be noted that the provisions of both the ECL and LOW Regulations also 
risk undermining the principle of subsidiarity.117 As, under Article 4 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, the European Commission and European Member States 
share competence with respect to intellectual property law, both are authorised to adopt binding 
legislative acts in this field.118 According to Article 2, however, this is subject to the caveat that 
Member States may only exercise their legislative competence insofar as the EU has ‘not 
exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence’.  
Because the EU has legislated in the OWD for an exception to copyright for certain 
uses of orphan works by certain beneficiary organisations, Member States are forbidden under 
Article 4 from usurping this exercise of legislative competence. They cannot legislate in a 
manner that undermines the exception. However, in enacting the ERRA, and the LOW and 
ECL Regulations thereunder, the UK appears to have done just that. Despite the fact that a 
licence fee must be paid in order to obtain a licence under the LOW Regulations, which is not 
required upfront to avail of the orphan works exception, licences granted under the LOW 
Regulations are likely to be much more attractive to prospective users of orphan works.119 
Users can be certain that they will not incur liability for copyright infringement by using an 
orphan work when operating under a licence, whereas they cannot be so certain that their 
actions fall within the scope of the orphan works exception. Licences granted under the ECL 
Regulations offer an even more attractive solution for prospective users of orphan works, as 
they do not require any form of diligent search. 
Evidently, licences under both the LOW and ECL Regulations may be granted to the 
same institutions intended to benefit from the orphan works exception, and in respect of the 
same type of works and uses covered by the exception, whilst offering a greater degree of legal 
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certainty. Therefore, it appears that the regulations impermissibly supersede the provisions of 
the OWD, as transposed in the UK by the CPUO Regulations.120 
 
G. PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS 
The potential for infringement of moral rights also arises where orphan works are used under 
any of the models discussed. However, the dearth of academic literature on this topic suggests 
that moral rights protection has been overshadowed by the goal of ‘free[ing] orphan works’.121 
The ECL Regulations do not refer to moral rights at all, and, though the LOW and CPUO 
Regulations purport to offer some protection of the moral rights of authors, this protection 
appears to be more tokenistic than substantive. 
While the failure to properly address moral rights protection in the UK regulations is 
unsurprising, given the traditional British ‘scepticism towards claims that authors deserve 
special protection in law’, the UK remains obliged, under EU law, to protect such rights.122 
Authors’ rights of attribution (encompassing the right to object to false attribution) and integrity 
are explicitly recognised by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, and provision for 
safeguarding those rights must be made at national level. These rights may be waived, but are 
typically non-assignable.123 
1. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works) Regulations 2014 
The CPUO Regulations state that for an orphan work to be used under the exception, it must 
be ‘reasonable to assume that the rightholders would not oppose the use of the work’.124 This 
appears to hint at the right of integrity. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that 
the individual ‘protected’ is the rightholder, rather than the author. Moral rights are intended 
to protect the author of a work, and it is not guaranteed that the author and rightholder will be 
one and the same. Indeed, a determination of how reasonable it is to assume that a rightholder 
or author would not oppose use of the work necessarily requires some degree of information 
about that individual and how he intends the work to be perceived.  
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The regulations also hint at the right of attribution by requiring that, in the course of the 
permitted use, the relevant body ‘acknowledge the name of any author or other rightholder in 
the work who has been identified’.125 Because no allowance is made for protecting the author’s 
right of integrity, however, it may be the case that including the author’s name on a particularly 
derogatory use of the material could cause more harm than good to his reputation.  
2. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) 
Regulations 2014 
The LOW Regulations, also hinting at protection of the right of integrity, state that the relevant 
licensing body may refuse to grant an extended collective licence ‘on the ground that, in its 
reasonable opinion, a proposed use or adaptation is not appropriate…[or] constitutes 
derogatory treatment of the work’.126 However, the fact that the licensing body may refuse to 
grant a licence on such grounds indicates that it is not obliged to. Because licensing bodies 
justify their existence by granting licences, they do not have an interest in being unduly 
deferential to the interests of authors by rejecting ‘derogatory’ uses. It is, therefore, unlikely 
that the moral right of integrity would be adequately protected. 
In any case, it is not clear why a licensing body should be in a position to determine 
whether or not a use or adaptation is inappropriate or derogatory. Despite the fact that UK 
courts have tended to favour an objective rather than subjective approach to the determination 
of whether use of a work is derogatory, and therefore prejudicial to the honour and reputation 
of the author, it is, appropriately, a judicial determination.127 The LOW Regulations also state 
that orphan licences granted by the authorising body must ‘provide that the use of an orphan 
work does not affect the moral rights of an author’.128 This provision has the effect of absolving 
users from liability for the infringement of moral rights. Thus, licensees are afforded free rein 
to use orphan works without considering whether their use would be likely to affect the moral 
rights of the author. 
3. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) 
Regulations 2014 
The ECL regulations contain no explicit recognition that the licensing of rights in works on 
behalf of others might give rise to infringement of moral rights, and contain no safeguards to 
prevent this occurring.  
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The failure of the UK’s three-pronged orphan works solution to consider moral rights 
is particularly concerning for two reasons. First, the development of technology has opened up 
a myriad of ways in which moral rights may be infringed. Poor quality digital display, 
watermarking, copying and pasting alongside other materials, and embedding links in digitised 
copies of works may all affect the moral right of integrity.129 In addition, digital works are 
easily stripped of metadata which could attribute them to a particular author.130 
Secondly, the fact that the UK regulations provide only for pecuniary, and not 
injunctive, relief for reappearing rightholders means that such rightholders may be unable to 
put a stop to uses they know are likely to infringe the author’s right of integrity. The CPUO 
Regulations merely provide that reappearing rightholders must be provided with fair 
compensation for use of the work.131 The LOW Regulations, in addition to providing for 
payment of a licence fee, state that orphan licences ‘shall continue for the remainder of their 
unexpired term, or until the expiration of the notice period … notwithstanding the fact that the 
rightholder is identified’.132 The legality of this provision is particularly questionable in light 
of the fact that the reappearance of rightholders necessarily puts an end to the orphan status of 
the work. Because the regulations only permit the issuance of licences in respect of orphan 
works, the legal basis for such licences falls away when works are no longer orphans. A similar 
question arises in respect of the ECL Regulations. Section 16(4)(b) states that, even if a non-
member rightholder attempts to opt-out of the system, licences already granted in respect of 
that rightholder’s work(s) will remain valid until their termination dates. However, the fact that 
opting out enables rightholders to ‘exclude or limit the grant of licences under an extended 
collective licensing scheme in relation to their rights in a relevant work’ would appear also to 
remove the legal basis for the continued validity of extended collective licences issued in 
respect of those works.133 
 
                                                 
129 Guy Pessach, ‘The Author’s Moral Right of Integrity in Cyberspace—A Preliminary Normative Framework’ 
(2010) 41(2) IIC 187, 244-245. 
130 Colin Davies and Tania Cheng, ‘Public Benefit or Private Loss - Orphan Works and the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013’ (2013) 18(3) Journal of Computer, Media and Telecommunications Law 74, 78. 
131 CPUO Regulations, s 7(3). 
132 LOW Regulations, s 12(3). 
133 ECL Regulations, s 16(1). 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
29 
H. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the three-pronged solution to the orphan works 
problem which has been implemented in the UK does not fully align with the objectives sought 
to be achieved. 
First, it does not generate sufficient legal certainty for prospective users of orphan 
works. The CPUO Regulations contain a number of poorly defined terms, impose obligations 
upon users which they cannot confirm have been suitably fulfilled and provide no guidance 
regarding the appropriate course of action for users where foreseeable difficulties arise. The 
LOW Regulations also contain a number of poorly defined terms and, by affording broad 
discretion to the relevant licensing body to refuse to grant extended collective licences on 
‘reasonable grounds’, leave users uncertain as to whether they are likely to be granted a licence 
following a diligent search. Though the ECL regulations appear to offer more legal certainty 
to prospective users, this has been undermined by a statement by the Intellectual Property 
Office to the effect that it is not intended for the licensing of orphan works. 
Secondly, the solution is limited in its ability to facilitate cross-border access to orphan 
works and their use in the context of mass digitisation. The orphan works exception 
implemented by the CPUO Regulations is extremely narrow in scope, and represents just one 
of a number of ways that the OWD exception may be interpreted by European Member States. 
The harmonising effect of the principle of mutual recognition must not be overstated, 
considering existing differences between national copyright laws. Indeed, those seeking to use 
orphan works for the purposes of mass digitisation are likely to be unable to avail of the 
exception, considering the prohibitive cost of carrying out a diligent search in respect of each 
work, and the fact that commercial uses are excluded from its scope. Even non-commercial 
mass digitisation initiatives will be hindered by the fact that stand-alone photographs are not 
covered by the exception. Though the licensing systems implemented by both the LOW and 
ECL Regulations are less restricted in scope, the fact that licences issued under both systems 
are valid only within the UK negates any possibility of disseminating orphan works online. The 
LOW Regulations also require a diligent search in respect of each work, which, as noted, would 
be prohibitively expensive on a mass scale. 
Thirdly, each prong of the solution appears to conflict, in some way, with international 
legal obligations. No aspect of the solution complies fully with each step of the three-step test. 
The system for opting-out of extended collective licensing schemes under the ECL Regulations 
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also appears to constitute a forbidden formality under the Berne Convention. Furthermore, both 
the LOW and ECL Regulations risk undermining the principle of subsidiarity. 
Fourthly, moral rights do not appear to be sufficiently protected by the solution. The 
half-hearted ‘protections’ for moral rights included in the CPUO and LOW Regulations appear 
more tokenistic than substantive, and the ECL Regulations provide no safeguards at all in this 
regard. 
The UK’s legislative response to the orphan works problem combines the weaknesses 
of three different approaches. Although each of these approaches also has attendant strengths, 
this paper argues that the system, as a whole, fails to fully realise a number of stated objectives. 
It is hoped that the paper has served to identify aspects of this system which require amendment 
or revision to more properly meet these objectives. In executing such amendments and 
revisions, however, the need to maintain a balance ‘between the rights of the authors, on the 
one hand, and the interest of the public in access to protected works, on the other’ must not be 
overlooked.134
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